What Is a Public Right in UK Law? Supreme Court Tests Public Nuisance

22nd Apr 2026
What constitutes a “right exercised by the public at large” is the central issue before the UK Supreme Court in a pending appeal concerning the scope of the statutory public nuisance offence. Under UK criminal law, liability in this context depends not only on whether obstruction occurs, but on whether the activity interferes with a right that belongs to the public as a whole rather than to a defined or permission-based group. The case turns on a critical evidential threshold within the statutory framework. A prosecution can only proceed if the right said to be obstructed is one capable of being exercised by the public at large. Where access arises through licence, permission, or conditional entry onto private premises, that requirement may not be satisfied. In such circumstances, the absence of a qualifying public right is capable of bringing proceedings to an end before they are considered by a jury. The Court is therefore examining whether obstruction at the boundary of private commercial premises—specifically access to and from a business site can meet that legal standard. The outcome will determine how far the criminal law extends into privately controlled environments that are routinely used by employees, customers, and suppliers, and will shape future enforcement, litigation strategy, and risk assessment in cases involving disruption to commercial operations. Public Nuisance Law: When Is a Right “Exercised by the Public at Large”? The case arises from a protest at a dairy production site in Droitwich, where individuals blocked access to and from the premises by attaching themselves to fencing and the road outside the entrance. They were charged under the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 with intentionally or recklessly causing a public nuisance. At trial, the defence submitted there was “no case to answer”, arguing that the prosecution had failed to establish a core statutory requirement: that the alleged obstruction interfered with a right capable of being exercised by the public at large. That submission was upheld at first instance. The Crown Prosecution Service successfully appealed, with the Court of Appeal finding that the legal threshold had been misapplied and ordering the case to proceed. The appeal now before the UK Supreme Court concerns whether that intervention was correct in law. The factual matrix is limited but legally significant. The protest prevented vehicle access to a privately owned industrial site for several hours, with the obstruction occurring at the boundary of the premises rather than within it. The prosecution case is framed around interference with access and egress. That interference is not disputed. The issue is whether the activity affected a qualifying legal right under the statute. The statutory framework imposes a two-stage requirement: it is sufficient that a section of the public is obstructed, but the right being obstructed must be one that belongs to the public at large. The appeal turns on the second limb. Specifically, the Court is asked to determine whether individuals accessing private commercial premises, whether individuals accessing private commercial premises, whether as employees, customers, or suppliers are exercising a right shared by the public as a whole when they approach, enter, or leave those premises. This distinction is determinative of criminal liability. If access to private premises is characterised as conditional or permission-based, rather than a public right, the statutory threshold is not met and proceedings cannot continue. The decision will therefore define the boundary between public and private rights within modern public nuisance law and will have direct implications for enforcement strategy, evidential thresholds, and legal risk exposure in cases involving disruption to commercial operations. Legal Framework and Competing Interpretations of Public Rights The statutory offence of public nuisance under the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 imposes a structured evidential requirement. The prosecution must establish not only that the public, or a section of it, has been obstructed, but that the obstruction interfered with a right capable of being exercised by the public at large. This two-limb test defines the boundary of criminal liability. Evidence of disruption alone is insufficient; the character of the right said to have been affected is determinative. The defence position is that this threshold was not satisfied. It contends that the prosecution failed to identify a qualifying public right, with the result that the case should not have proceeded beyond the close of the prosecution evidence. On that analysis, the issue is not the extent of interference, but whether the statutory definition of a public right has been met at all. The appeal therefore presents a direct conflict between competing interpretations of that concept. The prosecution advances a broad construction, rooted in the historical development of public nuisance. It argues that the offence protects the public’s ability to move freely and conduct ordinary activities without obstruction, and that this protection extends beyond formally defined legal rights to encompass practical freedoms of access and movement, including at the threshold of private premises where the public is permitted to be. The defence advances a narrower construction, grounded in the distinction between public and private rights. It argues that a right exercised by the public at large must be universal in character, rather than contingent on permission, licence, or conditional entry. On this view, access to private commercial premises, even where routinely granted to employees, customers, or suppliers, derives from the consent of the occupier and does not constitute a public right. The fact that a section of the public is affected does not alter the nature of the underlying right. This distinction is fundamental to the structure of the offence. Public nuisance operates to protect rights shared collectively by the public, not private or conditional interests, however widely exercised. If the boundary between those categories is diluted, the scope of the offence risks extending into areas traditionally governed by property law and regulatory control. The Supreme Court’s determination will therefore define the limits of criminal liability in cases involving disruption to privately controlled environments and will have direct implications for enforcement strategy, evidential thresholds, and risk assessment across commercial and public-facing operations. Implications, Legal Significance, and Anticipated Impact Although the case arises from protest activity, its implications extend across a wide range of commercial and regulated environments. Many organisations operate from premises that are privately owned but routinely accessed by employees, customers, contractors, and suppliers, including industrial estates, logistics centres, and large-scale commercial facilities. The central legal issue is whether disruption at such locations can engage criminal liability under public nuisance law, or whether it falls outside the statutory framework because the underlying rights are not exercised by the public at large. This question has direct consequences for legal risk and enforcement exposure. The statutory test does not turn on the existence of disruption alone, but on whether that disruption interferes with a qualifying public right. A broader interpretation of “public at large” would extend criminal liability into areas of commercial activity where access is conditional or controlled, increasing the scope for prosecution in cases involving interference with business operations. A narrower interpretation would reinforce the boundary between criminal law and disputes more appropriately addressed through private law remedies or regulatory controls, limiting the circumstances in which operational disruption escalates into criminal liability. At a structural level, the case tests the reach of criminal law into environments that are privately controlled yet functionally open to defined categories of the public. It raises a fundamental question about how statutory offences designed to protect collective public rights should operate in contexts governed by permission, licence, and conditional access. The resolution of that question will shape how courts distinguish between public and private rights, influencing not only protest-related prosecutions but also the broader legal framework governing access, obstruction, and liability. Although judgment is pending, the issues before the Court indicate that its reasoning will focus on the interpretation of “public at large” within the statutory scheme, including whether the concept is confined to legally enforceable rights or extends to broader freedoms of movement and access. The decision is also likely to clarify the role of trial judges in assessing whether the evidential threshold is met at an early stage, particularly where the character of the right in question is contested. The outcome will therefore have practical implications beyond the immediate case. It will inform how prosecutors frame charges, how courts evaluate evidential sufficiency, and how organisations assess and manage legal risk in situations involving disruption to access at privately owned but publicly used sites. What the Supreme Court Will Decide Next The UK Supreme Court has heard argument and is now awaiting judgment. Its decision will determine whether the trial judge was correct to halt proceedings at the “no case to answer” stage, or whether the Court of Appeal was right to conclude that the evidential threshold had been met and the case should proceed to a jury. More significantly, the judgment will clarify how courts should interpret the requirement that a right be “exercised by the public at large” under the statutory public nuisance framework. That clarification will define the boundary between qualifying public rights and activities that depend on permission, licence, or controlled access, and will determine how rigorously this threshold is applied at an early stage of criminal proceedings. The outcome is likely to influence how prosecutors assess charge viability, how trial judges evaluate evidential sufficiency, and how organisations understand legal exposure in situations involving disruption to access at privately owned but publicly used sites. In that sense, the decision will not only resolve the present appeal but will also establish a practical framework for the application of modern public nuisance law in future cases. Case Details Case: R v McCafferty and others Court: UK Supreme Court Respondent: Crown Prosecution Service Legislation: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 Issue: Scope of “public rights” under public nuisance law Status: Awaiting judgment People Also Ask (PAA) 1. What is a “right exercised by the public at large” in UK law?It is a right shared by the general public as a whole, rather than one limited to specific individuals or groups who have permission or contractual access. 2. What does “no case to answer” mean in UK criminal law?It means the prosecution has failed to present sufficient evidence on an essential element of the offence, so the case should not proceed to the jury. 3. Can blocking access to private property be a criminal offence in the UK?Yes, but only if the obstruction interferes with a right exercised by the public at large. If access depends on permission, it may fall outside public nuisance law. 4. What is public nuisance under UK law?Public nuisance is a criminal offence under the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 involving conduct that causes serious harm or obstructs the public in exercising shared rights. 5. Why is the Supreme Court case on public nuisance important?It will clarify whether access to private premises can count as a public right, shaping how courts apply criminal liability in cases involving disruption to business operations.